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A distinction was drawn earlier between cooperation and coordina-
tion, where cooperation means sharing of information and all the rest.
And the argument has been made that once you share information you
cannot really avoid coordination as well. Since we are on the eve of
Columbus Day, let me just share with you information that I received
yesterday from our colleague Buira; I think that it will raise the welfare
of all of us. He says we are all economists, we are talking about
cooperation and Columbus Day. What is common to Columbus and
economists? The answer is both left their home place without knowing
where they would arrive. Once they arrived, they did not know where
they were. And both did so at public expense.
The title of this panel session is so dramatic, almost Shakespea-
rean---To Coordinate or Not To Coordinate--that obviously we cannot
offer a very simple answer. So in outlining my ten minutes I thought of
at least four w’s and one h that one has to address, namely: why
coordinate? what to coordinate? who should coordinate? when should
coordination take place? and finally, the how. Well, we do not have time
to go through all of that, so I will just indicate some of the answers.
The intellectual case for coordination is rather well known and
obvious, especially in view of the discussion this morning. We know
that capital markets have become more and more integrated and that
floating rates have turned out to be less than insulating. In other words,
there are externalities, and when one country is under tight policy
measures, it affects the rest of the world. And if there are externalities,
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we feel that there must be a mechanism to internalize those externalities,
in order to bring us to something consistent with a global welfare. So in
this context, coordination can be thought of as the mechanism that is
used in order to internalize those externalities. But this suggests in
general the perspective that we see in some of the public pronounce-
ments that country A should take into account the effect of what it does
on country B, and therefore be "a little more realistic." That is really the
non-argument. The argument that should be used is the argument of
self-interest, the argument that basically a nation is in the same boat
with others. October 1987 illustrated it, and as a result we see that it is
in one’s self-interest to recognize that one is in the same boat with
others.
Now the process of coordination or cooperation tries to resolve the
paralysis that arises from excessive politeness, where everyone says,
"You go first." "No, you go first." The notion of coordination is to try
to get out of this particular bind. Of course all of the dangers of
coordination that have been already mentioned divert attention from the
real fundamentals that are out of line. Coordination may be on the
wrong policies. Countries do not share objectives. Countries do not
share beliefs about the way the economic system works. But all of these,
I think, are arguments against bad policies rather than arguments
against a mechanism for internalizing externalities, whether it is coop-
eration or coordination. No system can be designed that is immune from
bad policies, so the real question is whether a cooperative framework
will generate marginally somewhat better policies. Now what perspec-
tive should one take? On the average I would say "No." I would say in
cases of crisis, in extreme cases, that is where coordination counts. I
don’t know how many times the red telephone has been used, but it is
there precisely for that particular extreme case. Now you may say,
"Why have these ongoing meetings, if the cooperative framework is
useful only to resolve an extraordinary crisis?" The answer is that it is
very difficult to have a club where you can decide unilaterally that you’re
going to go out, take the key with you, and come back when you want.
If you are loud enough and you leave the club, even with the hope of
coming back, you may not find the club when you return. Coordination
is something that has to be routinely part of an ongoing process. One of
the difficulties we have is that excessive drama has been associated with
all of these meetings, and therefore a lot of expectations, resulting in a
lot of frustrations. Many, therefore, would like to have this machinery in
place on an ongoing basis, where most of the time it is sharing
information and things of that type and occasionally it is extinguishing
important fires.
About the next question, what should be coordinated, well, one
should probably back up and say what we should avoid. I think we
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easiest to coordinate, or we will also end up with the fallacy of the
lamppost and the coin. It is indeed the case that monetary policies are
the most flexible and have the machinery for communication. Monetary
authorities meet on a regular basis. But before long, you also end up
saying that political reality dictates that fiscal policies are slow; we
cannot do much, there are election cycles, so let us focus on monetary
policy. Then you end up wishing to have targets on interest rates,
because you worry about that, and growth and investment; you worry
about inflation, you worry about exchange rates. Finally everything is
loaded overwhelmingly on monetary policy, and that is an important
danger one should avoid.
On the other hand, one has also to avoid over-coordination. One
should not, of course, have a situation where one ignores the political
reality that sovereign states differ. And, therefore, one has to have
enough safety valves to allow the steam to go out without necessarily
creating a crisis. There must be room for a real exchange rate change, if
circumstances necessitate it, and there must be room for some flexibility,
so that not every little change means loss of credibility.
Let me say a word here about the INT, International Nominal
Targeting. One of the dangers of having those kinds of initials is that
international nominal targeting may also be thought of with INT--
Independent National Targeting--and I think a danger lies there. How
do you end up creating good initials that bring you to the right thing?
When should you coordinate and why? As I said, I believe that you
cannot expect or, therefore, call for anyone to undertake a policy that is
against his own perceived interest. So why should one coordinate? I
would like to think about it as a Weight Watchers’ Club. Some of us join
a Weight Watchers’ Club and you wonder why. After all, if you want to
go on a diet, you do it. But the fact of the matter is, we do not go to a
Weight Watchers’ Club to do what we do not want to do, but because
we think that somehow the peer pressure will be helpful. When I think
of some of the actions that have taken place during the last year on the
budgetary side, maybe in Japan, and even the limited budgetary actions
in the United States and some other policy actions, it would be hard
envision them taking place at that particular time without the "Weight
Watchers’ Club" discipline.
Who should coordinate? Well, again, the G-3 already exists, and the
G-5, G-10, G-7, G-22, G-24, G-77. We know that such groups should
definitely include those whose actions matter, so the major industrial
countries should be there. And how do you incorporate those who are
affected by these actions? Here the procedures are very important. I
want to say something about the line that Jeff Frankel suggested, the
nominal income targeting and the indicators, and what the G-7 should
set aside. The process itself of coordination has turned out to be
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request to the economics profession to supply (in its wisdom) the single
indicator that will do the job. So, therefore, I do not believe that this
should be regarded as the final revelation. We must understand why the
initial set of indicators was chosen, what political equilibrium it has
established, and how we can replicate what has been accomplished
using whatever more efficient process is available.
Let me just mention one or two last points. First, one of the things
we have to keep in mind is that we economists think of policy
instruments as the things that we use in carrying out the policy actions;
therefore, we have tax policy, fiscal spending, and defense, and all the
rest. Now there is a little problem when some of these instruments
become objectives rather than instruments in the particular case, be-
cause of other considerations. So suddenly defense, for example, and
taxes, are not so much instruments but are themselves objectives.
And, finally, the coordination of economic policies is a subset of a
broader domain of coordination and cooperation among sovereign
states. It is very difficult to take a specific summit and to look at the deals
that have been struck there on economic policy without concluding that
somebody seems to have given more and somebody else to have got
less. The accounting must be done in a broader context, since countries
have broader relations with others involving defense and otherwise,
and the economic summits are but part of it. You may then ask another
valid question: If economic summits are only a subset of the broader
range of relations among countries, why should we limit a session to
just economic matters? But, ! guess that is a question for a differenf time.
Thank you.